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SUPERVISORY POWER MEETS THE
HARMLESS ERROR RULE INFEDERAL GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held that an indictment could not be dismissed un-
less the error committed during the grand jury proceedings sub-
stantially influenced the grand jury.2 Initially, the district court had
attempted to use its supervisory power to dismiss the indictment be-
cause of violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the combined effect of various instances of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.3 However, the Supreme Court held that "a federal court may
not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless error in-
quiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)." 4
The harmless error rule, the Court stated, should be invoked5 in
cases where the error did not "substantially influence" the grand
jury's decision. 6 Therefore, where the grand jury has not been sub-
stantially influenced by the error, the error is harmless and a court
may not invoke its supervisory power to dismiss the indictment.
The effect of this ruling is to subordinate the supervisory doctrine to
the harmless error rule in federal grand jury cases involving non-
constitutional error.
This Note argues that the Court's subordination of the supervi-
sory power doctrine to the harmless error rule eliminates dismissal
of indictment as a supervisory power thereby reducing a court's con-
1 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
2 Id. at 2378.
3 United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1353 (1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456
(10th Cir. 1987), aft'd, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988).
4 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2373. FED. R. GRIM. P. 52(a) provides: "Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded."
5 When the harmless error rule is invoked, the error committed will lead to an affir-
mation of the indictment.
6 Id. at 2378.
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trol over its own proceedings. The decision suggests that defend-
ants can no longer expect grand jury proceedings free from even
intentional prosecutorial error. The Court reduces Federal Crimi-
nal Procedure Rule 67 to a guideline for grand jury proceedings and
strips it of its effect as law.8 Furthermore, this Note argues that
criminal defendants will now have an added burden to discover and
substantiate allegations of prejudicial error where, prior to Bank of
Nova Scotia, errors involving rule violations were presumed cause for
dismissal. 9 The Court broadens the scope of the harmless error
doctrine beyond its legislative intent.
Therefore, this Note concludes that in attempting to use the
harmless error rule to reduce the cost of repeating the grand jury
proceedings for trivial errors, the Court has sacrificed judicial integ-
rity and added undue burden on defendants. Supervisory power
should be a check on judicial proceedings to make certain that all
equities are in balance. Bank of Nova Scotia gives an unjust priority to
the harmless error analysis thereby effectively barring a court's au-
thority to supervise grand jury proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SUPERVISORY POWER
In addition to testing constitutional validity,' 0 the Supreme
Court is obligated to "Uj]udicial[ly] supervis[e] ... the administra-
tion of criminal justice in the federal courts [which] implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure." " I
Through its supervision, the Court seeks to remedy violations of
rights, maintain judicial integrity, and deter illegal conduct.' 2 At-
7 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 states:
(c) The foreperson [of the grand jury] shall have power to administer oaths and
affirmations and shall sign all indictments .... (d) Attorneys for the government,
the witness under examination, interpreters .... and.., a stenographer... may be
present while the grand jury is in session .... (e)(2) A grand juror, an interpreter, a
stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist . . . an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under.., this subdivision
shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury.
8 The prosecuting attorneys committed various knowing violations of Federal Crim-
inal Procedure Rule 6. See infra note 103 and accompanying text. Bank of Nova Scotia
may affect the operation of procedural rules similar to Rule 6. However, this Note dis-
cusses only Rule 6.
9 A defendant's discovery of grand jury proceedings is difficult considering the nu-
merous secrecy rules. Bank of Nova Scotia only compounds the defendant's burden of
effectively discovering and alleging a cause for dismissal.
10 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1942).
11 Id.
12 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983), cert. denied, Hasting v. United
States, 469 U.S. 1218 (1985).
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tempting to define supervisory power, one commentator suggests
that the Court uses supervisory powers in three situations: (1) cases
in which the Court is overseeing the quality of the judicial process;
(2) cases in which the Court is addressing the violation of a statute;
and, (3) cases in which the Court is trying to remedy conduct which
does not violate constitutional or statutory provisions, but is consid-
ered judicially inappropriate.1 3 It must be remembered that super-
visory power is not easily definable and that the principles
surrounding the judicial supervisory authority are constantly
developing. 14
Supervisory power was first recognized by the Court in McNabb
v. United States.15 The McNabbs had been arrested for allegedly
murdering a police officer. The officer had investigated the
McNabbs for selling whiskey without paying federal taxes.16 A fed-
eral officer was assigned to investigate the policeman's murder.
However, during the course of his investigation, the federal officer
violated several rules of criminal procedure. One of those violations
was failing to take the accused persons before a commissioner.17
The Court did not review the constitutional issue of illegally detain-
ing suspects, but rather focused on the need for a court to supervise
the conduct of investigating officers. 18 Ordering reversal, the Court
concluded that repeated violations of criminal procedure called for
supervisory intervention. 19
Most of the Court's post-McNabb development of the supervi-
sory power doctrine has been in the review of basic procedural and
evidentiary rules for federal criminal proceedings. 20 Supervisory
power has been asserted in cases ensuring fair juries by mandating
13 Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 194 (1969).
14 See generally id. at 181-205.
15 318 U.S. 332 (1942). For the history of federal judicial rulemaking and the influ-
ences that led to McNabb, see generally Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1435-1444 (1984); Hill, supra note 13, at 193-215 (1969); Comment,Judicially
Required-Rulemaking as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the Supervisory Power of
the Federal Courts, 72, Nw. U.L. REV. 595, 614-16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Judicially
Required Rulemaking]; Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1656 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Supervisory Power].
16 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322, 333-34 (1942).
17 Id. at 342.
18 Id. at 340.
19 Id. at 347. Interestingly enough, on remand evidence was brought forth that the
defendants were taken to a judicial officer after their arrest. United States v. McNabb,
142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1944). The McNabbs were convicted, and the convictions were
upheld on appeal. Id. Therefore, the supervisory power created in McNabb was based
on factual misconceptions.
20 Beale, supra note 15, at 1449.
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that jurors be chosen from throughout the community2 l and calling
for a new trial when jurors have access to pretrial publicity.22 In
most of these cases, the Court sought to ensure fairness in the judi-
cial process.2
3
There is little legislation regarding supervisory power. Aside
from statutes permitting courts to establish general rules of conduct
for court administration, 24 Congress has acted only twice in re-
sponse to Court rulings regarding supervisory authority. In re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States,25
Congress adopted in 1982 what is commonly referred to as the
Jencks Act 26 regarding disclosure of government memoranda. Also
that year, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act 27 limiting the McNabb decision.
28
Unlike the Supreme Court's creation of supervisory power in
McNabb, lower federal courts' source of supervisory power has not
been identified. 29 Since the Supreme Court's endorsement of the
21 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination is no basis to
exclude a person from grand jury duty).
22 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (new trial required because
jurors read newspaper articles alleging defendant charged with illegal dispensing of
drugs had committed two felonies). There is a wide array of cases in which the Court has
used supervisory powers. Some decisions are made solely by use of the power, while
others combine supervision with some constitutional question. For a more comprehen-
sive discussion of the cases involving the Court's use of supervisory power, see generally
Beale, supra note 15; Hill, supra note 13; Judicially Required Rulemaking, supra note 15;
Supervisoy Power, supra note 15.
23 Beale, supra note 15, at 1450. Also, as far as the creation of procedures, the Court
stated in McNabb that the Court must be "guided by considerations ofjustice not limited
to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance." McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341. Thus, as early
as the McNabb decision, the overriding consideration in the use of supervisory power has
been justice.
24 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982); FED. R. App. P. 47; FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 57(a). These rules provide for the creation of court procedures but do not
discuss the court's use of supervisory power as a method of dismissal.
25 353 U.S. 657 (1957)(government must disclose memoranda prepared by witnesses
against the defendant).
26 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985). Primarily, the Act limits the types of memoranda disclo-
sure required of the government. Also, directly influencing appeals of grand jury indict-
ments, the Act states that memoranda disclosure is forbidden until the witness has
testified on direct examination at trial.
27 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985).
28 Essentially, the Act declares that delay in presenting the accused before a judicial
officer only influences whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, not automati-
cally assumes that it was. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985). Recall in McNabb that one reversible
error was the federal investigating officer's failure to present the defendants to a Com-
missioner. This Act provides that such an error is only a contributing factor in the deci-
sion to reverse.
29 The first instance of lower federal court supervisory power was in Helwig v. United
States, 162 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1947), where the court of appeals ordered a new trial so
that the defendant could admit evidence even though he knew of its existence before the
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lower courts' supervisory authority, 30 the exercise of supervision has
been diverse.3 ' Most significantly, supervision has occasioned con-
trol of prosecutorial conduct 32 and of grand jury proceedings. 33
first trial. Id. at 839-40. The court needed to use its supervisory power to guarantee the
defendant's right to a new trial. Id. at 840.
30 See Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963)(per curiam)(where it is neces-
sary to correct plain errors on appeal, "the Courts of Appeals and this Court ... have
broad powers of supervision").
31 Supervisory power has been used to ensure judicial integrity involving use of false
evidence to obtain a warrant, United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980); to
create general procedural rules, United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.
1983)(new trial because trial judge took part in government's presentation); to regulate
admission of evidence, Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (new rules
created for consensual sodomy trials); and to govern jury trials, United States v. Florea,
541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976)(communication between parties or their representatives
and jurors during deliberation is per se prejudicial). This list is by no means exhaustive.
It represents the range and pervasive use of supervisory power by lower federal courts.
For a more comprehensive review of lower federal court exercise of supervisory power,
see Beale, supra note 15, at 1456-59. The nature of supervisory power (used at the dis-
cretion ofjudges) has divided the federal courts of appeals. For instance, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1038 (1983) has rejected the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Serubo, 604
F.2d 807 (3d. Cir. 1979), to use supervisory power to dismiss indictments where the
prosecutorial misconduct was not prejudicial to the defendant and where other avenues
of sanction were available. The inconsistent use of supervisory authority within the cir-
cuits itself raises questions of fairness.
32 Supervisory power has been used to create sanctions for prosecutorial miscon-
duct, United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(appeal by two attorneys
and client prosecuted for conspiracy to bribe a police officer based on prosecutorial
misconduct of "vindictive prosecution" is denied); to ensure professional standards,
United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (1974)(prosecutorial misconduct caused dis-
missal of criminal charges), appeal dismissed sub nom United States v. Means, 513 F.2d
1329 (8th Cir. 1975); to dismiss counsel who had a conflict of interest, United States v.
Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); and to exclude evidence procured through false
information, United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980). But see United
States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983)(for reversal of an indictment, prosecutorial
misconduct in grand jury proceeding must be so flagrant that it interferes with grand
jury's ability to exercise independent judgment). For a more comprehensive review of
supervisory use to control prosecutorial conduct, see Beale, supra note 15, at 1457-1459.
33 Supervisory power over federal grand jury proceedings has included dismissing
indictments because of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Ho-
gan, 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983)(prosecutor's abusive language, speculation, and use of
false testimony interfered with independence of grand jury); United States v. Estepa,
471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972)(prosecutor used hearsay evidence); United States v.
Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979)(grand jury deceived in a significant way by pros-
ecutor's conduct). Supervisory power has been used to require prosecution to make a
three-part preliminary justification to enforce grand jury subpoenas. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1976).
Supervisory power has also been used to dismiss indictments even where misconduct
was not shown to be prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir.
1979)(dismissed for misconduct but requiring initial determination whether misconduct
affected only an earlier grand jury). Additionally, supervisory power has been used to
dismiss perjury indictments where the prosecutor failed to warn a target of a grand jury
investigation before he testified. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 436 U.S. 31 (1978).
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Courts have delicately applied supervisory power to grand jury pro-
ceedings because such involvement may impinge upon the grand
jury's independence. 4  Although the Constitution calls for in-
dependent grand juries, the Court has not clearly defined the pa-
rameters of this independence.
35
When using supervisory power, lower courts may not ignore
Supreme Court constraints on constitutional remedies.3 6 To permit
otherwise, the Court has concluded, would extend judicial power
beyond the limits set by the Constitution. 37 However, lower courts
may set procedures which are not constitutionally stipulated. 38 Su-
pervisory power, in effect, can be a stopgap where the Court has not
identified procedural standards .
9
B. THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
At the turn of the 20th-century, appellate courts often reversed
district court decisions that were based on what amounted to trivial
errors. 40 Appellate courts were hesitant about declaring errors
harmless because the "harmless error" doctrine seemed to infringe
upon the jury's duty to weigh evidence. 4' Lawyers used this strict
Although this list is not exhaustive, it provides an insight into the amount of supervision
courts apply. For a more detailed examination of this area, see Beale, supra note 15, at
1458-59.
34 In ascertaining the need for trial, grand juries are not assigned to any particular
branch of the government. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: -[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a GrandJury." Addressing the proposition that supervisory power may bejudi-
cial encroachment on grand jury independence, the Court stated that the grand jury
"must be free to pursue its investigation unhindered by external influence or supervi-
sion." United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)(voice exemplars for identifica-
tion purposes do not violate the fourth or fifth amendments).
35 Beale, supra note 15, at 1460.
36 See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied 474 U.S. 1111 (1986)(pe-
titioner failed to timely object to decision and court of appeals would not use supervi-
sory power to extend filing period), in which the Court concluded that "[elven a sensible
and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional
or statutory provisions." Id. at 148.
37 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911
(1980).
38 See, e.g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1973) (state conviction affirmed
even though appellate court had objected to the same jury instruction in a federal case
because appellate courts may have trial courts "follow procedures deemed desirable
from the viewpoint ofjudicial practice although in no wise commanded by statute or by
the Constitution").
39 Beale, supra note 15, at 1464.
40 For a brief history of the harmless error doctrine, see generally R. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 4 (1970). One example of dismissal for trivial error is Peo-
ple v. Sinclair, 56 Cal. 406 (1880), in which an indictment was dismissed because "lar-
ceny" was misspelled on the indictment form.
41 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40, at 13.
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view of error as a weapon to gain dismissal.42 Critics called for
change.4
3
On the federal level, reform first took shape in several harmless
error statutes.44 The purposes of these statutes were to end costly
retrials and legitimize the appellate procedure by ridding court
dockets of cases founded on trivial error.45 These statutes broadly
defined harmless error as any error which did not "affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties." 46 But, difficulties arose in defining
substantial rights and in distinguishing substantial from technical
rights.47 Consequently, the factors defining substantial rights were
narrowed to include only the nature of the proceedings at issue, the
stake in the outcome, and the amount of influence the error had on
the judgment. 48 The last factor was given increasingly greater
weight in defining harmless error until courts eventually agreed that
"[t]he crucial [consideration] is the impact of the [error] on the
minds of other men." 49
Problems, however, arose in determining a level of assurance
that the error affected the jury's decision. 50 Before adopting the
harmless error rule in cases where the error involved constitutional
42 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). "So great was the threat of rever-
sal, in many jurisdictions, that criminal trial became a game for sowing reversible error
in the record, only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a new trial had
been thus obtained." Id. at 759.
43 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40, at 4. Among the multitude of comments on this devel-
opment in law, John Henry Wigmore characterized dismissals for trivial error as the
"Baal-worship of the rules of Evidence." Id. (quotingJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at
368 (3d ed. 1940)).
44 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
45 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40, at 14.
46 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). See supra note 4.
47 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946).
48 Id. at 762.
49 Id. at 764.
50 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40, at 33. Comparing the harmless error doctrine to the
level of assurance can be confusing. It might be easier to think of the assurance level as
a spectrum: on one end no certainty, followed by reasonably certain, then highly prob-
able, to certain beyond a reasonable doubt, and, on the opposite end, certainty. See
generally R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40. In determining the error's effect on the jury, the
extreme ends of the spectrum are, for the most part, not considered (as human beings,
we can speculate to some degree how other human beings would be affected by evidence
or testimony, but that same human characteristic will not allow us to be ever completely
certain of how another would react). Therefore, a judge is left with applying one of the
middle standards. When applying the harmless error doctrine to the highly probable
test, it means that in order for a conviction to be affirmed, the reviewing judge has to be
highly certain that the error was harmless. When the assurance test is only reasonable,
then the judge just has to be reasonably certain that the error was harmless. Therefore,
the less certain ajudge has to be before granting dismissal of a conviction or indictment,
the easier it is to apply the harmless error rule.
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rights, 51 the Court decided that the reviewing judge had to be cer-
tain beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the
jury's decision. 52 However, in federal cases involving nonconstitu-
tional issues, the level of assurance had not been established in all
case types. 53 Procedural errors, such as discrimination in the jury
selection process, 54 were almost always reversed. Assurance level of
harmful error ran high in cases involving such influences as trial
domination by hostile observers 55 or pretrial publicity. 56 The stan-
dard of assurance in other types of procedural error, such as willful
violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
prosecutorial misconduct, was less clear.
United States v. Mechanik 57 is the most recent case involving fed-
eral nonconstitutional error. A federal grand jury in that case in-
dicted the defendants on drug-related offenses and conspiracy.
58
51 For a discussion of the use of the harmless error doctrine where the error involves
a constitutional right, see S. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980).
52 Use of harmless error doctrine in cases involving constitutional rights was first
debated in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87 (1963) (defendant was convicted of will-
fully despoiling a public building by painting swastikas on a synagogue). Evidence ad-
mitted at trial in that case was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment right
against illegal searches and seizures. Id. The Court questioned "whether there was a
reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the con-
viction." Id. at 85-87 (emphasis added). The Court held that the possibility was indeed
more than reasonable that the jury was affected by the evidence and reversed the convic-
tion. Id. at 92. The "reasonable possibility" test was altered in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 19 (1967)(prosecutor, in violation of the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, commented on the defendant's failure to testify and the judge instructed
the jury that they could draw inferences from the defendant's silence). In reversing the
conviction, the Court held that to use the harmless error doctrine, the reviewing court
must be certain "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error did not affect the jury's
decision. Id. at 24. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)(prosecutor's
comment on defense's evidence and defendant's silence in closing arguments is viola-
tion of fifth amendment).
53 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40, at 48.
54 See, e.g.,.Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(racial discrimination in the jury
selection process compelled dismissal of indictment).
55 See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915)(conviction of defendant for the
murder of Mary Phagan not reversible on the basis of mob dominance during the trial
because the two crowd outbursts heard by the jury were not prejudicial); and Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)(a murder was committed due to outbreak of racial vio-
lence and the trial was dominated by a mob mentality which led to reversal of
conviction).
56 See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)(reversal of swindling charges because
four jurors saw most or all of news broadcasts regarding the trial and because cameras
and microphones dominated the courtroom); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963)(a change of venue was required where defendant's confession was broadcast
throughout the county of trial).
57 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
58 Id. at 67.
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During the grand jury process, two law enforcement officers testi-
fied in tandem. 59 The defendants appealed the indictment on the
basis that the in tandem testimony violated Rule 6(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 60 Before the appeal was heard, how-
ever, the defendants were found guilty at the trial.6 ' The Court held
that because the petit jury found the defendants guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, the appeal of the indictment was moot.62 However,
the Court did not say that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test
would necessarily apply in all cases involving federal nonconstitu-
tional error.
C. SUPERVISORY POWER MEETS HARMLESS ERROR
Many cases involve aspects of both supervisory power and
harmless error but few courts have wrestled directly with the con-
vergence of the two doctrines.63 The standard for supervisory
power use when a statute is involved was established in Thomas v.
Arn64 in which the Court said "[e]ven a sensible and efficient use of
the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional
or statutory provisions." 65 In United States v. Payner,66 the Court said
that to permit supervisory power to invalidate statutes would "con-
fer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered
59 Id.
60 Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) provides: "Attorneys for the government, the witness
under examination, interpreters.... and ... a stenographer... may be present while
the grand jury is in session." Note that "witness" is singular.
61 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 67.
62 Id.
63 At times it is difficult to determine whether a court is addressing the conflict be-
tween harmless error and supervisory power or only one of those topics. For instance,
in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), where the defendant's conviction was
overruled because women were not permitted to serve on the grand jury, it is difficult to
determine whether reversal was based on harmless error, whether the court wanted to
exercise supervisory power to ensure a fair trial, or both, thereby establishing that where
there is a "harmful" error, supervisory power is appropriate. The Court did not ex-
pressly state its holding in terms of a clash between supervisory power and harmless
error. Another example is United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980)(conviction of
defendant for falsifying federal income tax return affirmed even though government ille-
gally searched third party's briefcase for evidence against defendant). The Court dis-
cussed harmless error and supervisory power in a roundabout way. It concluded that
the exclusion of necessary but illegally seized evidence "exacts a costly toll" upon a
court's ability to discover the truth. Id. at 734. The Court might be claiming that the
cost of retrial has to be weighed against the magnitude of the error-but this is not clear.
Similar cases will not be explored in this section in order to avoid confusion. Rather,
discussion is limited to those situations in which the Court expressly debated use of
supervisory power in place of harmless error.
64 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
65 Id. at 148.
66 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 67
The peculiar nature of the conflict between harmless error and
supervisory power is furthered by the dilemma that harmless error
statutes do not offer specific boundaries for their application.
Rather, they apply when even something less than substantial rights
have been abridged. 68 Courts have struggled to determine when su-
pervisory power may be used, at what point harmless error analysis
takes over, and whether the two are unrelated.
The Supreme Court first addressed this convergence in United
States v. Hale.69 In Hale, the defendant was arrested for robbery and
while at the police station asserted his right to remain silent. 70 At
trial, however, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant's
testimony by suggesting his silence was somehow incriminating. 7'
The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to employ super-
visory power to reverse the conviction because the defendant's as-
sertion of his right to remain silent had no probative value and the
prosecutor's questioning had "a significant potential for preju-
dice."' 72 In terms of harmless error analysis, this decision suggests
that supervisory power is appropriate where there exists a signifi-
cant possibility that the error or conduct affected substantial rights.
The prevailing decision in the convergence of the harmless er-
ror and supervisory doctrines involving constitutional harmless er-
ror was United States v. Hasting.73 Respondents were charged, tried,
and convicted in Hasting for kidnapping and transporting women
across state lines for immoral purposes, and for conspiring to com-
mit such offenses.74 The respondents did not testify during the
trial. 75 During summation, and over defense counsel's objection,
the prosecution made references to the respondents' silence. 76 As
in Hale, the court of appeals used its supervisory power to reverse
the conviction because the summation violated the respondents'
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 77 The court
did not rely on harmless error because use of that doctrine " 'would
67 Id. at 737.
68 See supra note 4. Note that there is no boundary provided around the concept of
"substantial rights."
69 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
70 Id. at 173-74.
71 Id. at 175.
72 Id. at 180.
73 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
74 Id. at 501-02.
75 Id. at 502.
76 Id. at 502-03.
77 Id. at 503. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[n]o person.., shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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impermissibly compromise the clear constitutional violation of the
defendants' Fifth Amendment rights.'"78 The Supreme Court up-
held the district court and stated that even constitutional violations
are subject to harmless error.79 The Court concluded that the use
of "[s]upervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a
remedy when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since, by
definition, the conviction would have been obtained notwithstand-
ing the asserted error." 80
The lower courts disagree in the application of supervisory
power when there are nonconstitutional errors in the trial process.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided in United States v.
Serubo 81 that dismissal of an indictment is permissible even if there is
no actual prejudice.8 2 In the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court held
in United States v. McKenzie83 that an indictment could be dismissed
only when the defendant's case has been unfairly prejudiced. 84 In
United States v. Pino,85 the Tenth Circuit determined that indictments
could be dismissed only where there has been a "significant in-
fringement on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent
judgment." 8
6
Arguably, Mechanik 87 is also a case in which supervisory power
and the harmless error doctrine converged.88 However, the super-
visory power in Mechanik is of a different sort than in the cases cited
above. The court of appeals dismissed the indictment thereby re-
78 Id. (quoting United States v. Hasting, 660 F.2d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1981)).
79 Id. at 508.
80 Id. at 506.
81 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979)(reversal of convictions for internal revenue violations
even though the errors committed during trial were not prejudicial; errors committed
included violations of issuing subpoena and prosecutorial misconduct in questioning
witnesses).
82 Id. at 817.
83 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982)(grand jury indicted several police officers for miscon-
duct; defendants' appeal based on prosecutorial misconduct is denied).
84 Id. at 635.
85 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983)(defendant convicted of manslaughter; due process
not violated by 28-month delay between arrest and indictment nor was prosecutorial
misconduct flagrant enough to support an infringement on the grand jury's ability to act
independently).
86 Id. at 530.
87 475 U.S. 66 (1985). See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Mechanik. Briefly, though, the prosecution violated Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 6(d) regarding permissible grand jury appearances. Id. at 67. The Court held that
where a petit jury subsequently convicted the defendant, the indictment could not be
dismissed because of a rule violation. Id.
88 It can be argued that the court of appeals used supervisory power to reverse the
conviction because of the Rule 6 violation and that the Supreme Court upheld the con-
viction because the error was harmless.
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versing the conviction because the prosecutor violated Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6 and not because the court believed it was
necessary to invoke supervisory power.8 9 But by dismissing the in-
dictment, the appellate court signalled to trial courts that supervi-
sory power is a means of dismissing statutory violations.90
Furthermore, Mechanik cannot be classified as a true supervisory
case because the Supreme Court did not weigh the error on the
minds of the grand jurors to determine if the error affected their
decision. 9 1 Rather, the Court assumed the error was not prejudicial
because the petit jury convicted the defendants. 92
As of the initiation of the grand jury proceedings against the
defendants in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court had not deter-
mined whether a district court might use supervisory power to dis-
miss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct and rule violations
committed during the grand jury investigation where the errors did
not prejudice the defendants. The procedural differences between
trials and grand jury proceedings may call for different views of su-
pervisory authority in cases involving harmless error.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1982, eight defendants were indicted by two successive
grand juries93 on 26 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Some of the
defendants were also indicted with mail and tax fraud. 94 The final
89 Id. at 69.
90 Id. The court of appeals was not using supervisory power to determine whether a
rule was violated-that was a conclusion of fact. Rather, the court dismissed the indict-
ment and conviction because there was no other prescribed avenue of sanction.
91 Id. at 70.
92 Id.
93 Assisting the grand juries were two attorneys from the Tax Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice. The attorneys were assisted by Internal Revenue Service personnel.
Brief for the Respondent at 7, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369
(1988)(Nos. 87-578 and 87-602).
94 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2372 (1988). The indict-
ment alleged that defendant Kilpatrick and his company, United Financial Operations,
marketed illegal tax shelters. Brief for Petitioner Bank of Nova Scotia at 5, Bank of Nova
Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988)(No. 87-578). Count I charged six defend-
ants with willful tax fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The basis of the conspiracy
charges was the creation of mineral leases of false tax deductions for nonexistent ad-
vance royalty payments for investor-taxpayers. Count II charged five defendants with
similar conspiracy as in Count I in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The basis of this count
was the creation of false tax deductions on conjured research and development pay-
ments coming from investments in limited partnerships formed to fund research and
development of methanol conversion processes. Counts III through X charged various
defendants with aiding and assisting in the preparation and presentation of false part-
nership and individual tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Defendants alleg-
edly made false claims to taxpayers regarding deductions for royalty entitlements or
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count charged one defendant with obstruction of justice. 95
The district court dismissed the first 26 counts on the grounds
that the indictment failed to charge a crime and was improperly
pleaded. 96 The court also dismissed the charges against the Bank of
Nova Scotia because the indictment failed to allege the Bank's or its
representatives' requisite knowledge or intent to commit the crimes
charged.97 The government appealed all the dismissals.98
Prior to oral argument, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit partially remanded the case to determine if
grounds for dismissal should also have included prosecutorial mis-
conduct and irregularities in the grand jury proceedings. 99 Before
and immediately after the partial remand, the district court granted
defendant Kilpatrick a new trial on the obstruction of justice count,
and ordered the government to disclose transcripts of the grand
jury proceedings. 00
After ten days of post-trial hearings, the district court dismissed
all 27 counts. 10' The dismissal was based on prosecutorial viola-
tions of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 0 2 and
on the totality of the circumstances involving the prosecutors' be-
havior.' 0 3 The district court determined that the prosecutors' mis-
research and development. Counts XI and XII charged two defendants with willfully
making and filing false individual tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). Counts
XIII through XXVI charged various defendants with substantive mail fraud violations
for allegedly defrauding investors through the mail in the conspiracy outlined in Counts
I and II in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456,
1460-61 (10th Cir. 1987).
95 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2372 (1988).
96 United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (1984).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1987).
10o Id. The court characterized the grand jury proceedings as "bizarre." United
States v. Kilpatrick, 575 F. Supp. 325, 327 (1983). In response, the government insti-
tuted a mandamus proceeding and received a temporary restraining order prohibiting
publication of the opinion. Both mandamus petition and restraining order were later
denied. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369
(1988)(No. 87-578).
101 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (1988).
102 See supra note 7 for the provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 involved in this case.
103 The district court determined that the government violated Rule 6 by:
(1) administering unauthorized oaths to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents in
violation of Rule 6(c);
(2) causing the same IRS agents to summarize falsely evidence against the Bank
and by permitting joint appearances by IRS agents before the grand jury in violation of
Rule 6(d);
(3) disclosing grand jury materials to IRS agents involved in civil tax enforcement,
failing to notify promptly the court of this disclosure, disclosing the names of persons
targeted for grand jury investigation to possible witnesses, and imposing unauthorized
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conduct prevented the grand jury from acting independently of the
prosecution. 0 4 Furthermore, the court dismissed on the basis of its
supervisory power and stated that "the supervisory authority of the
court must be used in circumstances such as those presented in this
case to declare with unmistakable intention that such conduct is
neither 'silly' nor 'frivolous' and that it will not be tolerated."' 0 5
A divided panel of the appellate court then reinstated the in-
dictment. 0 6 The court held that violations of Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 6 are not per se grounds for dismissal. 10 7 It also held
that dismissal could not be based on the totality of circumstances
because the misconduct did not interfere with the grand jury's abil-
ity to act independently.' 0 8 The court concluded that "the drastic
remedy of dismissal of an indictment, whether premised on due pro-
cess or supervisory powers theories, cannot be exercised without
significant infringement on the grand jury's ability to exercise in-
dependent judgment." 10 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the tenth circuit decision to determine the use of supervisory power
in light of the harmless error rule. More specifically, the Court
framed the issue as "whether a District Court may invoke its super-
visory power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct
in a grand jury investigation, where the misconduct does not preju-
dice the defendants."
110
secrecy obligations on two grand jury witnesses for strategic purposes in violation of
Rule 6(e). United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1344-45 (1984).
Although some of the prosecutorial conduct could not on its own be the basis for
dismissal, the district court held that the totality of the misconduct called for dismissal.
The government's misconduct included:
(1) violations of the Witness Immunity Statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003) by
granting pocket immunity to 23 witnesses;
(2) violations of the fifth amendment by calling seven witnesses who the govern-
ment knew would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination;
(3) violations of the sixth amendment by interrogating high level bank employees
after the indictment;
(4) knowing and deliberate presentation of misinformation to the grand jury;
(5) verbal mistreatment of a defense witness before grand jury members; and
(6) numerous violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6. Id. at 1348-
1353.
104 Id. at 1353.
105 Id.
106 United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1475 (1987).
107 Id. at 1469.
108 Id. at 1472.
109 Id. at 1475.
110 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2372 (1988).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Writing for the majority,"1 ' Justice Kennedy held that "as a
general matter, a District Court may not dismiss an indictment for
errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the
defendants."'1"2 Justice Kennedy noted that a federal court has the
authority to exercise supervisory power"13 and stated such power
cannot conflict with constitutional requirements or federal statutory
prescriptions. 14 Nor can, said the Court, the harmless error rule" 15
be disregarded."t 6 A difficult question arises, Justice Kennedy
stated, when the dismissal of a grand jury indictment conflicts with
the harmless error inquiry required by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." t7 The tension results from the use of supervisory
power to address procedural violations that are harmless."l 8 Em-
bedded in that tension is the task of defining a harmless error." 9
When dismissal of the indictment is sought for nonconstitu-
tional errors, Justice Kennedy concluded that an error is harmful
and thereby dismissible "only 'if it is established that the violation
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if
there was 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the
substantial influence of such violations."' 120 Justice Kennedy cited
Vasquez v. Hillery 121 and Ballard v. United States 122 as examples of ex-
II" Along with Justice Kennedy, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
O'Connor, Stevens, and White constituted the majority. Id.
112 Id. at 2373.
1'' Justice Kennedy flatly asserted that a federal court " 'may within limits, formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
114 Justice Kennedy stated that" '[e]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory
power... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.' " Id. (quot-
ing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985)).
115 See supra note 4.
116 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2374. Justice Kennedy stated that "Rule 52 is, in
every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal
courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disre-
gard constitutional or statutory provisions." Id. Justice Kennedy also emphasized that
the harmless error rule balances the rights of the accused and costs to society. He
warned that the harmless error rule may not be "casually ... overlooked" through use




120 Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
121 474 U.S. 254 (1986)(racial discrimination in selecting grand jury members re-
sulted in dismissal of indictment).
122 329 U.S. 187 (1946)(women were excluded from the grand jury).
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ceptions to the harmless error rule. 123 The grand jury's structural
protections 124 in these cases are violated so that the proceedings are
presumed prejudiced 125 and application of harmless error would re-
quire unguided speculation. 126
Citing Mechanik 127 and Hasting,'28 Justice Kennedy stated that
the harmless error test is applicable when a court must determine
the validity of an indictment before the conclusion of the trial and
the prosecutorial misconduct is not prejudicial to the defendant. 129
In applying the harmless error test, Justice Kennedy warned that "a
federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the
harmless error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure 52(a).'
30
The majority then assessed whether there was grave doubt that
the grand jury was substantially influenced by the prosecutors' viola-
tions and misconduct in this case.' 31 Justice Kennedy focused on
five findings of the district court that had the possibility of throwing
123 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2375.
124 Id. Although Justice Kennedy does not define "structural protections," the cases
cited suggest he was referring to the fair selection of the grand jury.
125 Id. (construing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-578 (1986)).
126 Id.
127 475 U.S. 66 (1986). In Mechanik, the Court held that there is "no reason not to
apply [Rule 52(a)] to 'errors, defects, irregularities, or variances' occurring before a
grand jury just as we have applied it to such error occurring in the criminal trial itself."
Id. at 71-72.
128 461 U.S. 499 (1983). Hasting limits use of supervisory power as deterrence where
"means more narrowly tailored" may dissuade prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 506.
Also, where the error is harmless, worry over the "integrity of the Uudicial] process" is
less burdensome. Id. Furthermore, a court may not disregard the harmless error rule
"in order to chastise what the court view[s] as prosecutorial overreaching." Id. at 507.
129 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2374.
130 Id. Contrary to the appellate court,Justice Kennedy did not equatejudicial assess-
ment of the violations' influences on the grand jury with infringement on the grand
jury's independence. Id. Such infringements may, but not necessarily will, he said, sub-
stantially influence the grand jury's decision to indict. Id. Justice Kennedy added that
the Court did not grant certiorari to decide the issue of grand jury independence. Id.
Presumably, the grand jury's independence means its ability to conduct the grand jury
proceedings and reach a decision without undue influence by either the government or
the defense. The grand jury should not act as an arm of the government. See United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 17 (1973).
131 Justice Kennedy readily dismissed the following violations' influences on the
grand jury:
(1) violation of the sixth amendment by conducting investigations on bank em-
ployees occurred after the indictment and, therefore, could not have influenced the de-
cision to indict;
(2) violation of the fifth amendment by calling seven witnesses who were predicted
to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination was not error because the govern-
ment was not required to depend on unsworn assertions by these witnesses and the
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grave doubt on the grand jury's charge.1 32 First, the Court con-
cluded that the jurors were adequately advised that the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) agents sworn as "agents" of the grand jury
were aligned with the prosecutors. 33 Second, in regard to the IRS
agents' false summaries, the majority decided that the Government
did not cause the agents to testify falsely and that the unreliable evi-
dence was not enough reason to dismiss the indictment. 3 4 Third,
Justice Kennedy found nothing to indicate that the prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jurors substantially affected the charg-
ing decision. 3 5 Fourth, as to the Government's grant of pocket im-
munity 36 to 23 witnesses, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
grand jury was not substantially influenced.13 7 Finally, the majority
government repeatedly requested the grand jury not to draw any conclusions from a
witness's use of the fifth amendment;
(3) manipulation of the grand jury investigation to gather evidence for civil tax
investigations could not affect the decision to indict;
(4) violation of rule 6(e) by revealing targets of grand jury investigation to poten-
tial witnesses could not affect the charging decision;
(5) violation of rule 6(e) by imposing secrecy violations on grand jury witnesses
could not alter the decision to indict. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2375-76. The
majority did not give specific reasons why the last three violations could not affect the
charging decision.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2376-77. Justice Kennedy supported this conclusion by citing prosecutorial
references to the IRS agents as "my agent(s)" and grand jury references to the agents as
"your guys" or "your agents." Id. at 2377.
134 Id. Justice Kennedy emphasized that an indictment valid on its face cannot be
challenged on the reliability or competency of the evidence presented. Id. at 2377 (cit-
ing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974)). Also, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that a court may not look behind the indictment to determine if the evidence
was sufficient. Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)).
135 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the prosecutor requested the grand jury to disre-
gard the conversations. These ameliorative measures were sufficient to alleviate grave
doubt that the grand jury was substantially influenced by the remarks. Id.
136 Pocket immunity is "putative immunity granted to a witness by letter or oral repre-
sentation of the prosecutor rather than ordered by a judge after satisfaction of the pro-
cedures of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003." United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223,
233 (1983).
137 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2377. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the jurors
were aware that these witnesses made a deal with the Government thereby alleviating
the substantial influence of the pocket immunity. Id. Also, the Court said that a substan-
tial effect on the charging decision could not be construed by the fact that some prosecu-
tors told the grand jury that the immunized witnesses could invoke a fifth amendment
privilege while other prosecutors stated the witnesses had no such privilege. Id. Justice
Kennedy noted that if the Government threatened to revoke immunity, prejudice might
be established. Although one witness believed that the prosecutor's statement that if he
"'testified for Mr. Kilpatrick, all bets were off' "was a threat to withdraw immunity if he
did not conform his testimony, the Court found this was not enough to warrant dismis-
sal. InsteadJustice Kennedy claimed that, at most, the reliability of his testimony would
be questionable. Id. at 2377-78 (quoting United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324,
1338 (1984)).
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acknowledged that permitting two IRS agents to read transcripts in
tandem was in violation of Rule 6(d). 138 Such a violation did not,
however, prejudice the grand jury. 3 9 Justice Kennedy further
noted that the alleged misconduct occurred over the course of a 20-
month investigation with many witnesses and documents. 140 In the
totality of such an involved investigation, the Court concluded that
the "violations that did occur do not, even when considered cumula-
tively, raise a substantial question, much less a grave doubt, as to
whether they had a substantial effect on the grand jury's decision to
charge."141
Justice Kennedy stated that alternatives to dismissal included
contempt of court, 142 directing the prosecutor to show why he
should not be disciplined,143 and reprimanding the prosecutor in a
published opinion. 144 The Court said that these alternatives would
reprimand the prosecutor but not "grant ... a windfall to the un-
prejudiced defendant[s]."
145
The Court concluded that a district court could dismiss an in-
dictment upon finding that the defendants were prejudiced by the
prosecutorial misconduct. The district court must determine
whether the errors impacted the grand jury's decision to indict. "If
violations did substantially influence [the] decision [to indict], or if
there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from such
substantial influence, the violations cannot be deemed harmless." 1
46
The Court held that the errors in this case did not pass this standard
and affirmed the indictment.
147
B. THE CONCURRENCE
Concurring, Justice Scalia 148 acknowledged that federal courts
have the authority to dismiss grand jury indictments procured in vi-
138 Id. at 2378.
139 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the agents did not offer original testimony and that
the jurors were instructed not to question the agents during the reading. Id.
140 Id.
14' Id.
142 Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) states: "A knowing violation of rule 6 may be pun-
ished as a contempt of court."
143 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378. Justice Kennedy asserted that the judge






148 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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olation of the law. 149 Justice Scalia further acknowledged that the
Supreme Court may review lower courts' use of supervisory power
although he did not see any direct authority for the Court to super-
vise lower courts.150 Justice Scalia stated that lower courts might
use their supervisory powers to regulate a prosecutor's performance
before the court and to establish that a prosecutor is a member of
the court's bar.15' Justice Scalia then merely said, "I join the opin-
ion of the Court because I understand the supervisory power at is-
sue here to be of the first sort."'152
C. THE DISSENT
In the dissent, Justice Marshall argued by reference to his ear-
lier dissent in Mechanik,153 where he asserted that the "goal of up-
holding criminal convictions not marred by substantial defect does
not justify reducing Congress' command regarding the proper con-
duct of grand jury proceedings to a mere form of words, without
practical effect." 154 Unfortunately, he said, the secrecy of the grand
jury process makes prosecutorial misconduct difficult to prove.' 55
In light of this procedural advantage for the prosecution, Jus-
tice Marshall stated that Rule 6 had "little enough bite."' 56 He then
assailed the majority for leaving the rule "toothless" by subordinat-
ing it to the harmless error rule.' 57 Moreover, Justice Marshall
claimed that this could not have been Congress' intent. 58
149 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
151 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
152 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
153 475 U.S. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a review of this case, see supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text. Mechanik, however, involved the prosecutor's violation of
Rule 6(d) by permitting two law enforcement agents to testify in tandem before the
grand jury. In the present case, additional violations occurred. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text for discussion of these violations.
154 Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Defendants, he
said, regularly must rely on theJencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which allows for disclosure
of grand jury transcripts only after trial is underway, making dismissal difficult for de-
fendants to procure in the first place. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the
information disclosed may be incomplete. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
156 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 82-83 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall outlined the
legislative history of Rule 6 and how the harmless error doctrine was intended to affect
Rule 6 errors in Mechanik. Due to the presence of stenographers at grand jury proceed-
ings, Congress enacted a harmless error rule to offset dismissals due to Rule 6 viola-
tions. Act of 1946, § 1025 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 556 (1985). However,
Congress never disagreed with the general idea that the presence of unauthorized per-
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Justice Marshall then noted that affirming criminal convictions
not marred by substantial error in the grand jury process reduces to
formality Congress' intent as to proper conduct in grand jury pro-
ceedings. 5 9 Respect for the law and legislative intent, Justice Mar-
shall claimed, require dismissal of indictments issued for rule
violations so that " 'the ardor of prosecuting officials be kept within
legal bounds and justice be secured.' "160 Deterrence of Rule 6 vio-
lations could be achieved only by a per se rule of dismissal. 16 1
Justice Marshall also asserted that the prejudicial impact cre-
ated by Rule 6 violations would be impossible to evaluate accu-
rately. 162  Reviewing cases for alleged prejudice places an
administrative burden on courts and will not offer defendants mean-
ingful protection. 163 Justice Marshall concluded that subjecting
Rule 6 to harmless error analysis reduces that rule to "little more
than a code of honor that prosecutors can violate with impunity."164
V. ANALYSIS
Supervisory power and the harmless error doctrine should be
applied in conjunction to ensure the defendant of a fair trial and to
uphold the integrity of the judicial system. In Bank of Nova Scotia,
however, the Supreme Court did not establish a technique by which
both judicial tools work together to achieve these goals. Instead,
the Court subordinated the use of supervisory authority to the
harmless error rule thereby narrowing the scope of a fair trial and
devaluing the integrity of the judicial system. Rather than using the
tools of supervisory authority and harmless error to improve the ju-
dicial process, the Court in Bank of Nova Scotia misapplied them
thereby misshaping their definitions and misdirecting their
purposes.
Originally, harmless error doctrine was adopted to prevent de-
fendants from receiving unfair advantages.165 One argument rightly
sons in the grand jury proceedings invalidates the indictment. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 83
(Marshall, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall also asserted that in the Advisory Committee
notes to the harmless error doctrine espoused in 18 U.S.C. § 556 (1946 ed.), harmless
errors are those'" 'in matter of form only' " which did not prejudice defendant. Id. at 87
n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(quoting Act of 1946, § 1025) (codified as amended 18
U.S.C. § 556 (1985)).
159 Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (quoting United States v. Remington, 208 F. 2d 574 (1946)(Hand, J.,
dissenting)).
161 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162 MVechanik, 475 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 See supra notes 10-40 and accompanying text.
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posed in favor of the harmless error doctrine is the high cost of re-
trial.' 66 The harmless error rule is appropriate where excessive ob-
servance of formality turns courtrooms into technical battlegrounds.
The Supreme Court, however, has now expanded this initial intent
of the doctrine so that all alleged errors are reviewed in light of
potential, prejudice suffered by the defendant. 167
The supervisory power doctrine has been used to ensure fair-
ness to the defendant and the judicial system where sanctions are
not prescribed or where the error is not specifically addressed in a
statute. 68 Judges use the power to manage court business by en-
suring that conduct follows statutory guidelines.169 The judge can
therefore use supervision as a means of ensuring the fairest out-
come possible.
It seems odd that these two tools striving for equity should
clash. Yet the differing methods of attaining that goal can conflict.
In United States v. Kilpatrick,170 the district court used its supervisory
power to correct the prosecutor's violations of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and his misconduct. 17 The appellate court ap-
plied the harmless error rule to hold these violations benign. 72
The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision 73 and
subordinated supervisory authority to a new narrow definition of
harmless error. Now, errors are harmful and dismissible only where
they substantially prejudice the defendant. 17
4
The Court did not note that the supervisory doctrine, however,
has a much larger scope of dismissible errors. That doctrine in-
cludes not only the prejudicial impact suffered by the defendant, but
also the prejudicial impact on the integrity of the judicial system. 175
In reality, these two types of prejudicial errors must be related: er-
rors prejudicing the defendant also negatively affect the integrity of
166 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72.
167 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2373 ("[A]s a general matter, a District Court may
not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors
prejudiced the defendants.").
168 See supra notes 10-39 and accompanying text.
169 In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980), the Court said,
"[S]upervisory power serves the 'twofold' purpose of deterring illegality and protecting
judicial integrity."
170 594 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1984). This is the case name of Bank of Nova Scotia in
the district court.
171 Id. at 1353.
172 United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1466, 1475 (1937).
173 Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (1988).
174 Id.
175 See Hill, supra note 13, at 92; Beale, supra note 15, at 1450-53.
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the judicial system.' 76 In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court
ignored this relation, perhaps thereby sacrificing the goals of super-
visory power and the harmless error rule.
The Court decided that because " '[e]ven a sensible and effi-
cient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with
constitutional or statutory provision,' ",177 and because the harmless
error doctrine was a statutory provision, supervisory power must
bow to harmless error.178 This ruling thereby effectively eliminates
dismissal of a grand jury's indictment as a supervisory power.' 79
Now, only where the grand jury's decision to indict has been
substantially influenced by error can there be dismissal of the indict-
ment based on the harmless error rule.' 80 Substantial prejudicial
influence means an error harmful enough to dismiss.' 8 ' Therefore,
only harmful errors can result in dismissal. Other errors are harm-
less and no other means of intervention, including supervisory
power, can achieve dismissal.
Bank of Nova Scotia also has due process 8 2 implications. A de-
fendant cannot expect a trial free of all error, 8 3 but now a defend-
176 In United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 527 (1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting),
Justice Brennan stated:
Both the harmless-error rule and the exercise of supervisory powers advance the
important judicial and public interest in the orderly and efficient administration of
justice. Exercise of the supervisory powers also can further the strong public inter-
est in the integrity of the judicial process .... Admittedly, using the supervisory
powers to reverse a conviction under these circumstances appears to conflict with
the public's interest in upholding otherwise valid convictions that are tainted only
by harmless error. But it is certainly arguable that the public's interests in preserv-
ing judicial integrity and in insuring that Government prosecutors, as its agents,
refrain from intentionally violating defendants' rights are stronger than its interest
in upholding the conviction of a particular criminal defendant. Convictions are im-
portant, but they should not be protected at any cost.
177 Bank of Nova Scotia 108 S. Ct. at 2373 (quoting Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148
(1985)).
178 Id.
179 In Hasting, Justice Brennan noted that the Court's decision to use the harmless
error doctrine to affirm a conviction "could be read to establish a per se rule against use
of the supervisory powers to reverse a conviction based on harmless error." Hasting,
461 U.S. at 523, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, however, did not believe
that the Court had either addressed or decided this point. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J. dis-
senting). Bank of Nova Scotia, however, closes the door on the use of supervisory power
where there is harmless error because only substantially prejudicial errors (harmful er-
rors) result in dismissal. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378.
180 Id.
181 Id. Because the Court determined that the district court could not dismiss absent
a finding of prejudice that substantially influenced the jury, it follows that substantial
prejudice is the new definition of a harmful error.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
183 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946). "By [the] very nature [of
justice] no standard of perfection can be attained."
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ant cannot expect a trial free of even flagrant procedural error or
intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Essentially, due process in
grand jury proceedings currently means an indictment free from
prejudicial error regardless of statutory violations or prosecutorial
misconduct during the proceedings.
Bank of Nova Scotia also strips Federal Criminal Procedure Rule
6 of its statutory rank, reducing it to a suggested guideline for grand
jury proceedings.1 84 Given Bank of Nova Scotia, the only enforceable
statute is Rule 52 whereby all errors-statutory or otherwise-are
reviewed for their prejudicial impact. If a Rule 6 error is not preju-
dicial then Rule 6 is suspended; if a Rule 6 error is prejudicial then
Rule 6 is enforced. The need, then, for Rule 6 has been effectively
eliminated.
All alleged errors, including those defined by Rule 6, can be
subjected to the Rule 52 harmless error test. The effect of this
broad application leads to the absurd result that the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure applicable to grand jury proceedings are re-
duced to the harmless error test.' 8 5 This could not have been the
legislature's intent.
Additionally, the Court's misapplication of the harmless error
rule is not supported by legislative history. The committee note
corresponding to Rule 52(a) states that the rule was a restatement of
28 U.S.C. § 391186 and 18 U.S.C. § 556.187 The language of these
two rules strongly suggests that the harmless error doctrine was
originally meant to affirm decisions where the error was superfi-
cial. l88 The Court has severely narrowed the meaning of "substan-
184 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
185 If the decision reduces Rule 6 to whatJustice Marshall refers to as a code of honor,
then the remaining Federal Criminal Procedure Code follows a similar fate. See Bank of
Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
186 The Committee stated
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in
any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the
entire record before the court, without regard to "technical errors, defects, or exceptions"
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) advisory's committee's note (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 391)(emphasis
added).
187 The committee further stated:
No indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or other court of
the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or
other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of "any defect or imperfection in
matter ofform only," which shall not tend to prejudice of the defendant.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 556)(emphasis added).
188 "Technical errors, defects, or exceptions", 28 U.S.C. § 391, and "any defect or
imperfection in matter of form only", 18 U.S.C. § 556, suggest that legislative intent was
focused on technical or superficial errors.
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tial rights."18 9 Congress, however, must have intended "substantial
rights" to include the grand jury guidelines set forth in the criminal
code or it would not have gone to such lengths to promulgate pro-
cedural rules ensuring the integrity of grandjury proceedings. This
is not to imply that all rules promulgated by Congress are accorded
substantial rights status. But, where extensive rules are set forth to
ensure that the accused is guaranteed certain procedural guidelines
assuring the accused a fair hearing or trial, there is a strong pre-
sumption that those guidelines are themselves substantial rights.
According to 28 U.S.C. § 391 and 18 U.S.C. § 556, where substan-
tial rights are involved, only technical errors or errors of form can
be viewed as harmless. The Court does not view the grand jury pro-
cedures or prosecutorial conduct as substantial rights outside the
scope of the harmless error doctrine. The Court has thus narrowed
the meaning of substantial rights and enlarged the opportunity for
using harmless error far beyond the intent of the legislature.
Bank of Nova Scotia places an enormous burden on a defendant
to prove that the grand jury was prejudicially affected by error. 190
Yet, grand jury proceedings by their very nature are difficult for de-
fendants to appeal.19 1 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
189 The two statutes state that where substantial rights of the parties are involved,
technical errors will not cause dismissal of a conviction or indictment. This suggests
that technical errors of rights which are less than substantial may lead to dismissal. Cer-
tainly the legislature sought to avoid dismissal for technical defects in all cases. How-
ever, the latter interpretation of the statute may lead to the notion that where less than
substantial rights are involved, the error does not have to be as egregious as in cases
involving substantial rights in order to result in dismissal. Therefore, the more a right is
substantial, the more egregious the error must be before the error will result in dismis-
sal. The dilemma is in deciphering what the legislature considered a substantial right as
opposed to what the Court considered a substantial right. The latter question can be
easily addressed. If a substantial right is viewed as that which any error can result in
dismissal (exceptions to the harmless error rule), then Bank of Nova Scotia itself spells out
the class of cases the Court would dismiss without harmless error review: cases involv-
ing the structural protections of the grand jury as in Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986),
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), and Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946). The small size of this class of cases indicates that the Court takes a very narrow
view of substantial rights.
190 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191 As Justice Marshall suggests, because of the strict secrecy associated therewith,
defendants have virtually no access to information regarding grand jury proceedings.
Also, requests for disclosure of grand jury materials are almost never granted. Access to
grand jury materials allowed under theJencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1982), is permitted
only after the trial has begun. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 60, 80, 81
(1986)(Marshall, J., dissenting). The protection offered by theJencks Act was diluted in
Mechanik where the conviction of defendant at trial prevented a reversal of the indict-
ment. Id. at 66. If the defendant is not entitled to grand jury transcripts until trial is
underway, the court reviewing a motion to dismiss the indictment need only wait until
trial is over and if the defendant is convicted, the motion to dismiss indictment is moot.
Id. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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guideposts leading to an equitably issued indictment. Now that
Bank of Nova Scotia has essentially removed those guideposts, the de-
fense has an even more difficult task of detecting and proving preju-
dicial errors. Instead of a clear statutory basis for dismissal, the
defense is now at the mercy of judicial speculation over the magni-
tude of the error.
Supervisory power ought to be employed in cases like Bank of
Nova Scotia where procedural guidelines are violated and
prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. In a narrow application of
the cost/benefit analysis, 192 the cost of dismissal would be another
grand jury proceeding which might only result in reindictment.
However, the greater implications made in this analysis predict a
greater cost to the integrity of the judicial process that must eventu-
ally limit the rights of the defendant in a grand jury proceeding.
The effect of this decision is to make dismissal of federal grand
jury indictments more difficult and increasingly unlikely. The Court
has swung the harmless error pendulum from the need to remove
decisions for the defense based on excessive formalities to the op-
posite end where the defense has the burden of effectively alleging
prejudicial impact on the mental process of grand jury members.
The Court misapplied the tools of supervisory power and harmless
error so that the goals of judicial integrity and fair grand jury pro-
ceedings are still unmet.
Furthermore, courts are now far less able to correct the attacks
on the integrity of the judicial system resulting from rule violations
and prosecutorial misconduct. If a court cannot control the behav-
ior and procedures before it, no other avenue remains to protect the
judicial system. This dilemma is even more alarming in the grand
jury stage than at the trial stage because during the former, the ac-
cused has few methods of ensuring a fair grand jury proceeding and
must rely on the court to uphold the procedural guidelines when
violations have occurred. In other words, during a grand jury pro-
ceeding, the defense has no process available to correct or contra-
dict violations as it has at trial.
Flagrant and repeated prosecutorial misconduct and proce-
dural violations during a grand jury proceeding are substantial vio-
lations that result in harmful errors that cannot be categorized as
technical errors and defects. Dismissal is an extraordinary means of
correcting errors. 9 3 But, if the harmless error pendulum is to
192 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
193 The Court suggested that attorneys who commit errors like those in Bank of Nova
Scotia be disciplined by other means such as contempt charges. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108
S. Ct. at 2378. But there might be reasons why a reviewing court would reject the use of
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swing to a more middle ground, between use of the harmless error
doctrine to prevent technical errors from resulting in dismissal of an
indictment and the over-use of the harmless error rule in all but a
very few cases involving a narrow definition of substantial rights,
dismissal should be used more often in cases wherejudicial integrity
and the defendant's right to a grand jury proceeding free from fla-
grant rule violations are abridged.
Also, in the vein of squeezing out equity in the Bank of Nova
Scotia decision, the standard of harmless error review should be
more clearly defined so as to accommodate the need to make at least
a deferential nod in the direction ofjudicial integrity and adherence
to procedural rules. The Court stated that where there is "grave
doubt that the decision to indict was free from such substantial in-
fluence, the violations cannot be deemed harmless."' 94 The review
standard ought to be that where the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, not left to just the obscure standard of a "grave
doubt," the reviewing court should affirm the indictment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supervisory power and the harmless error doctrine can and
ought to work in conjunction to maintain and perhaps to improve
the quality and integrity of federal grand jury proceedings. It is a
mistake to permit one doctrine to overshadow the other. Bank of
Nova Scotia elevates the harmless error doctrine above supervisory
power even though such a decision contravenes legislative intent,
places added burden on the defendants, and ignores due process
concerns. Where the harmless error rule should act as a check on
certain types of errors, supervisory power should catch those errors
which threaten the judicial process. Bank of Nova Scotia, however,
broadens the use of harmless error by limiting the definition of a
substantial right and precluding supervisory power from acting as a
secondary check guarding the judicial process. The result is a dan-
gerous imbalance of equities in grand jury proceedings.
However, the Bank of Nova Scotia decision can be rendered more
palatable if the standard for harmless error review is strict. Any er-
methods other than dismissal. United States v. Hasting, 61 U.S. 499, 522 (1983). One
such reason is the "futility of relying on Department of Justice disciplinary proceed-
ings." Id. It should also be restated that the prosecutor's actions and violations have
affected more than just that particular proceeding. Also at stake are the integrity of the
judicial process and eventual impact on the grand jury process. Taken in that context,
dismissal may be the only appropriate method of discipline.
194 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378.
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ror may be deemed harmless only if the court is certain beyond a
reasonable doubt that the grand jury was not prejudiced.
This solution is temporary. A complete review of the use of
harmless error and supervisory power is necessary to achieve a bal-
ance between judicial efficiency and judicial integrity. In Bank of
Nova Scotia, the Court subordinated the tool of supervisory power to
the harmless error rule. As a result, judicial integrity was sacrificed
for a narrow view of reversible error. The goals of fair grand jury
proceedings and judicial integrity are still unmet.
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